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5Monetary and Fiscal Policies: 
Ordinary Recessions and Financial Crises
Svetoslav Semov
Abstract
This paper uses two different samples to study the effects of monetary and fiscal 
policies on the profiles of recessions and recoveries. Several results emerge 
from the econometric analysis presented. First, monetary policy during ordinary 
recessions and banking crises is a powerful tool with lasting effects that extend 
to recovery growth rates. However, the effect of monetary policy during financial 
crises is strongly diminished in the case of forbearance – banks left to function 
despite being technically insolvent. Second, the effectiveness of fiscal policy is 
reversed – it is a powerful tool during banking crises, but it does not seem to 
significantly affect recovery growth rates during ordinary recessions. Finally, 
the policy response during past financial crisis does not seem to be particularly 
expansionary – on the contrary, fiscal policy is markedly procylcical, while 
monetary policy is neutral. This is proposed as an alternative explanation to the 
one usually given for the sluggishness of financial crises. 
  
I. Introduction
The Global Recession of 2008-09 sparked renewed interest in systemic 
financial crises. A key observation, first documented by Kaminsky and Reinhart, 
was that recessions associated with financial crises turn out to be particularly severe 
and protracted (1999). Most of the work on financial crises has concentrated on 
real-economy variables like output loss, length, depth etc. (Reinhart and Rogoff, 
2009; Kannan, 2010; Claessens et al., 2004). The role of monetary and fiscal 
policies in financial crises has not been extensively studied with the exception 
of a 15-country study in the latest issue of the World Economic Outlook (IMF, 
2009). It is possible that inappropriate monetary and fiscal policies are one 
reason why recoveries associated with financial crises turn out to be particularly 
severe. In addition, it might be that in those cases in which monetary policy was 
appropriately used, its effectiveness was diminished because the monetary policy 
transmission mechanism was impaired as a result of the stress in the banking 
system (IMF, 2009a).
6This paper attempts to empirically evaluate the effect of monetary and 
fiscal policies in financial crises on the duration of the recession and the strength 
of the recovery. It further tries to examine if the effectiveness of monetary policy is 
dependent on the implementation of financial reforms. As a benchmark, recessions 
are employed to evaluate the normal impact of monetary and fiscal policies on 
recovery growth rates. Several results emerge from the econometric analysis 
presented. First, expansionary monetary policy during ordinary recessions is a 
powerful tool with lasting effects that extend to recovery growth rates. However, 
fiscal policy does not seem to affect post-crisis growth. Second, expansionary 
monetary policy during financial crises still has a positive but insignificant effect 
on the strength of the recovery, while expansionary fiscal policy has a positive 
and significant effect. Furthermore, these results are preserved in the analysis of 
the duration of the recession. Some empirical evidence is provided that explains 
the ineffectiveness of monetary policy by numerous cases of forbearance – 
banks left to function despite being technically insolvent. Finally, fiscal policy in 
financial crises seems to be markedly procyclical – the authorities cut government 
consumption on average by 2.5 percent of GDP during the duration of the 
downturn. Monetary policy, on the other hand, seems to be countercyclical – real 
money market rates are decreased on average by once percent during the duration 
of the downturn. 
Two different samples are used. The first one uses quarterly data for a set 
of seventy crises in nineteen developed countries to analyze the effect of the policy 
response on the duration of the downturn and recovery growth rates. The second 
one employs yearly data for a set of eighty financial crises episodes in different 
countries to do the same. In addition, the impact of forbearance on monetary policy 
is also estimated. In both cases, the goal is to use the variation in policy responses 
and outcomes to find out the relationship between the variables of interest. 
7Eight sections follow. Section II reviews other cross country studies that 
examine the profiles of recessions and recoveries associated with financial crises. 
Section III presents a graphical interpretation of a linearized New Keynesian 
model with a risk premium. Within this framework, I explain the difference 
between financial crises and ordinary recessions. Furthermore, I illustrate the 
importance of monetary and fiscal policy. In addition, in Section III, I provide 
a concise analysis of the policy response in twelve financial crises and I argue 
that non-Keynesian policies are the norm rather than the exception. Section IV 
specifies the econometric model to be used. In addition, it discusses alternative 
versions of the model that should be estimated to check for the robustness of 
results. Section V describes the data, on which the analysis will be based and its 
sources. Section VI presents evidence on the effectiveness of monetary and fiscal 
policies in both ordinary recessions and financial crises and discusses the role of 
forbearance on monetary policy effectiveness. Finally, Section VII concludes and 
summarizes the results. 
II. Literature Review
This paper will attempt to add to the literature on cross-country studies of 
financial countries. Most studies examining recoveries and recessions associated 
with financial crises look at outcomes (output loss, duration of recession, 
sluggishness of recovery) without explicitly answering the question what it is 
that causes financial crises to be such protracted affairs. In addition, they do not 
include the policy response in the analysis.
For example, Reinhart and Rogoff conduct a comparative historical analysis 
of the aftermath of systemic financial crises (2008). The countries under 
consideration are both developed and emerging economies that have experienced 
financial distress in the after-war period. Reinhart and Rogoff’s analysis shows 
8deep and lasting effects on output and employment. Unemployment rises for 
five years and output declines last on average for two years following the peak 
of economic growth. This is substantially more than the length observed during 
“normal recessions”. However, the authors do not provide any explanations for 
why this might be the case. Their analysis is merely comparative.
Boysen-Hogrefe et al. use a parametric framework to test whether the size 
of the bounce-back of GDP following an ordinary recession is larger than that 
following a recession associated with a banking crisis or housing crisis. The study 
covers 16 industrialized countries from 1970 to 2006. The results indicate that 
the output loss during an ordinary recession is completely offset in the following 
recovery. This is not the case when the recession was triggered by a banking crisis 
or a housing crisis. Again, this study does not offer explanations for why this 
might be the case – it simply makes this observation. 
Kannan offers one possible reason why recoveries from banking crises 
might be more protracted (2010). Using a sample of 21 industrialized economies 
from 1970 to 2004, the author documents that it takes 5 ½ quarters for output to 
recover following a banking crises, while it takes only 3 quarters following a normal 
recession. Evidence is presented that stressed credit conditions are an important 
factor containing the pace of the recovery. Industries that are more reliant on external 
finance, or more subject to financial frictions, are found not to recover as fast as 
other industries following all kinds of recession. The author finds strong evidence 
that the differential growth patterns across industries is much more pronounced in 
the aftermath of a financial crisis than it is for other recessions. 
One potential drawback of this study is the small sample. The author 
relies on just 15 financial crisis episodes, not all of which are systemic.   
9There is another strand of literature that attempts to explain why some 
financial crises are so prolonged. This strand analyzes the effect of financial 
policies on the depth and duration of recessions. For example, Cecchetti et al. 
explore a vast array of financial policies (liquidity support, deposit freeze, blanket 
guarantee, bank holiday, forbearance etc.) and find that establishing an asset 
management company is associated with shorter recessions (2009). Furthermore, 
the authors find that forbearance is strongly associated with bigger output losses. 
Other financial policies do not seem to have a significant effect on length, depth 
and cumulative output losses during recessions associated with financial crises. 
Also, Claessens et al. find that that excessive fiscal outlays delay economic 
recovery.The fiscal outlay figure includes both fiscal and quasi-fiscal outlays for 
financial system restructuring, including the recapitalization costs for banks, bailout 
costs related to the government covering obligations due to depositors and creditors, 
and debt relief schemes for bank borrowers. Furthermore, better institutional 
framework, as characterized by less corruption and greater judicial efficiency, does 
reduce output losses, even when controlling for excessive fiscal outlays. 
In summary, the literature on financial policies might explain why some 
financial crises are so prolonged – if they were not followed by the implementation 
of the appropriate financial system reforms. 
In addition, there is another reason financial crises might turn out to be 
more sluggish than ordinary recessions – if monetary and fiscal policies were not 
appropriately used. The effect of monetary and fiscal policies is explored in the 
most recent World Economic Outlook (IMF, 2009). The authors find that monetary 
and fiscal policies tend to shorten the duration of all types of recessions. Both 
increases in government consumption and decreases of interest rates beyond what 
is warranted by a Taylor rule positively and significantly affect recovery growth 
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rates. However, when only financial crises are analyzed the effect of monetary 
policy is found not to be statistically significant. One drawback of this study is 
that the sample for banking crises is limited to only fifteen episodes in developed 
countries. This study is also related to the literature on the monetary policy 
transmission mechanism. If the transmission mechanism is affected, then the 
way monetary policy works could also be influenced. For example, the interest-
rate and the bank-lending channels could be hampered by the stress experienced 
by the financial system, something that might lead to reduced effectiveness of 
monetary policy (IMF, 2009a).
This paper attempts to add to the discussion of the sluggishness of 
financial crises. It will build on previous work on the effects of monetary and 
fiscal policies during banking crises (IMF, 2009).  In particular, a larger sample 
than used before will be employed to test whether the strength of the recovery and 
the duration of the recession are affected by the policy response. In addition, the 
impact of monetary policy will be examined in cases of forbearance. If the lack 
of financial reforms proves to change the effectiveness of monetary policy, then 
this might give another explanation why some countries take so long to recover 
following a banking crisis. Finally, the extent to which fiscal and monetary 
policies have been used in past financial crises is documented. 
III. Financial Crises and Past Policy Responses
Various studies analyze the link between the financial sector and the real 
economy (Bernanke, 1983; Bernanke and Gertler, 2000; Kiyotaki and Moore, 
1997). In this section, I review some of the existing literature that explains 
how the financial sector can amplify output shocks, making a recession deeper 
and more prolonged. Furthermore, I use a graphical version of a linearized 
New Keynesian model that incorporates a risk premium and demonstrates the 
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difference between financial crises and ordinary recessions. Finally, I propose an 
alternative explanation for the severity of financial crises – the policy response. 
I argue that financial crises are often a time of immense political and economic 
turmoil, something that often leads to the pursuit of non-Keynesian policies. In 
addition to providing some possible explanations for the contractionary policies 
countries have undertaken during financial crises, I review, in detail, the policy 
response in twelve systemic banking crises. The episodes discussed suggest that 
both developed and developing countries have pursued non-Keynesian policies 
in the past. 
Financial Crises: Why are They Different from Ordinary Recessions? 
Some evidence has been found for Milton Friedman’s “plucking model” 
which says that cyclical contractions tend to dissipate more quickly the larger the 
size of the contraction (Sinclair, 2005). However, financial crises do not seem 
to follow this pattern. They serve as an amplification mechanism that magnifies 
and accompanies other types of shocks like exchange rate, domestic and foreign 
debt crises (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009a). An essential part of this amplification 
mechanism is the asymmetric information problems that arise during a financial 
crisis (Bernanke, 1983). Bernanke claims that the loss of confidence in financial 
institutions and the widespread insolvency of debtors lead to increased cost of 
credit intermediation, because banks cannot differentiate between good and bad 
borrowers. Consequently, potential worthy borrowers cannot undertake their 
projects; also savers have to devote their funds to inferior uses. As a result, there 
is a contraction in economic activity.
Bernanke and Gertler (2000) formulated a formal model that explains 
how the financial system serves as an amplification mechanism to negative shocks 
that hit the economy. The initial output shock leads to a decrease in wealth, which 
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makes firms more dependent on external financing. A weak banking system 
cannot provide that financing, leading to a decline in investment. Kiyotaki and 
Moore trace a similar dynamic in a richer intertemporal model (1997). A collapse 
in land prices undermines a firm’s collateral, something that decreases its credit 
limit. This causes it to pull back investment in assets and hurts it even more in the 
next period. 
The dynamics described above can be analyzed within an otherwise 
standard New Keynesian model that includes a risk premium. The model has the 
following equations (Clarida et al., 1999): 
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This is a linearized version of a New Keynesian model (Clarida et al., 
1999). The AS curve is derived from the Euler equation of firms. It is referred to 
as the New Keynesian Phillips curve. It shows a positive relationship between 
prices and output, because an increase in output leads to higher real marginal 
costs, which in turn make firms increase their prices. The parameters π, πe, Y
t
, Y
t
n 
represent inflation, expected inflation, output and the natural level of output (the 
level that will arise if prices are perfectly flexible). The parameter α refers to the 
fraction of sticky-price firms. The larger this fraction is, the flatter the AS curve, and 
correspondingly, the smaller change in price level economic fluctuations produce. 
The last term of the AS curve, u
t
 , is referred to as “cost push”, i.e. anything else 
that might affect marginal costs. In addition, it is a random disturbance term that 
follows an autoregressive pattern.
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 The IS curve is derived from the consumption Euler equations of 
households, that is the household’s optimal saving decision. In this equation the 
current output gap depends on expected future output, E
t
 (Y
t+1
–Y
t
n
+1
), and the 
real interest rate – (i
t
-E
t
 πt+1). Higher  expected future output raises the current 
output, because consumers want to smooth consumption, and, therefore, consume 
more today. In addition, the negative effect of the real interest rate reflects the 
intertemporal substitution of consumption.  The last term of the IS curve, g
t
, is 
a function of expected changes in government purchases relative to expected 
changes to potential output. Since g
t
 shifts the IS curve, it is interpretable as a 
demand shock (Clarida et al., 1999). Also, g
t 
is a random disturbance term that 
follows an autoregressive pattern.  
Finally, the TS curve links the real risky rate, r, and the federal funds 
rate, f. The parameter σ is the risk premium. Although, the optimization of the 
monetary authority’s loss function is not a part of the model, it implicitly enters the 
selection of the appropriate level of the federal funds rate f. The Fed’s stabilizing 
policy rule makes it offset shocks to the risk premium or to expected inflation. 
Recessions associated with financial crises can be analyzed within this 
model. More importantly, the difference between those recessions and “ordinary” 
recessions can be illustrated. In the model normal recessions are usually caused 
by a leftward shift in the IS curve – a demand shock. For example, the demand 
shock in the financial crisis of 2008 was the collapse of the housing market that 
caused residential investment and consumption to fall. During times of financial 
distress there is an additional factor at play – the risk/liquidity premium σ. A 
jump in its value shifts the TS curve up, raising real interest rates on corporate 
bonds, mortgages, and other risky assets. This is consistent with Bernanke’s 
claim that higher cost of credit intermediation leads to increased interest rates 
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or to a curtailment of credit (1983). In the model, the increased interest rates are 
represented by the risk premium. The shift of the TS curve is also consistent with 
the lowering of borrowers’ credit limits in Kiyotaki’s model, something that also 
leads to higher interest rates (Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997). 
For example, at the start of the financial crisis of 2008 there was an 
uncertainty associated with the solvency of various financial institutions. Also, 
there was a huge fire sale of risky assets in an effort to raise cash. Such events 
cause the TS curve to go up (the movement of the curve could be observed in the 
equations above – as σ increases, r rises as well). An upward shift in the TS curve 
leads in turn to a decrease in investment and consumption, causing output to fall 
even further (illustrated by an upward movement along the IS curve).  The graphs 
below illustrate these dynamics:
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In step (1) the economy is undergoing a demand shock often responsible 
for ordinary recessions. In cases of financial distress, there is an additional force, 
illustrated in step (2), which is exacerbating the recession. 
This model can be further used to illustrate how the policy response 
can add to the severity of a financial crisis. Expansionary monetary policy is 
represented by downward movements along the TS curve (the Fed optimizes 
its loss function, choosing the appropriate level of f), which lead to downward 
movements along the IS curve and correspondingly to higher output. Fiscal policy 
acts through the IS curve – an increase in government spending shifts the IS 
curve to the right, leading to an increase in output. Unconventional policies, like 
measures to calm down financial markets, go through the TS curve. For example, 
stress tests of the banking system lead to a decrease in σ, the risk premium, and 
a downward shift of the TS curve. Also, quantitative easing can target the term 
premium and also shift down the TS curve. 
The model specified above is useful for distinguishing between financial 
crises and ordinary recessions. Furthermore, it illustrates the possible impact 
of monetary and fiscal policies. However, it does not differentiate between the 
effectiveness of these policies in different environments. For example, Gali (2005) 
and Eggertsson and Krugman (2010) demonstrate within a New Keynesian model 
with heterogeneous agents that during times of financial crises the number of 
credit constrained agents increases. As a result, government spending is effective 
in raising the disposal income of those agents, something that makes them spend 
more. In other words, these studies imply that fiscal policy might be more effective 
during times of financial crises.
 In addition, monetary policy might also have different effectiveness in 
various environments. For example, if the transmission mechanism is affected 
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during a financial crisis, then the way monetary policy works might change. 
The interest-rate and the bank-lending channels could be damaged by the stress 
experienced in the financial system. (IMF, 2009a). Furthermore, if the economy 
is in a liquidity trap, as during Japan’s 1997 recession, then traditional monetary 
policy instruments are also not as effective as they would be under normal 
circumstances. 
Why is the Recovery Slow?
The recovery from a financial crisis is slower than that from an ordinary recession 
for similar reasons. As Bernanke argues, it takes time to establish new or revive 
old channels of credit (1983). Furthermore, it takes time to rehabilitate borrowers. 
This last idea is further developed by Koo (2009). He argues that financial crises 
are usually connected to “balance sheet” recessions. The last can result from a 
shock to balance sheets – for example, a bubble burst – that often accompanies 
financial crises. Then, it takes time for households and businesses to repair their 
balance sheets. For example, Japan’s recovery during the “lost decade” was 
prolonged as a result of an overhang of corporate debt. Similarly, an overhang of 
household debt is probably holding down U.S. economic growth right now. 
Why has the Policy Response in Past Financial Crises not been Keynesian? 
The divergent policy responses to financial crises have their basis in the 
fundamental theoretical disagreement about the effects of stabilization policies 
that exists in the economic profession. Starting in the 1970s there was a shift in 
economic thinking led in part by Edward Prescott that resulted in the formation of 
New Classical economics. A main part of this shift was the idea that activist policies 
to fight the business cycle are undesirable. This was because recessions result 
from the rational decision of workers to work less when the economic conditions 
are less favorable and, therefore, are the natural course of events. However, there 
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were still economists who believed that recessions are caused by demand side of 
the economy – the New Keynesians. They worked to incorporate enough frictions 
into the Real Business Cycle models of New Classical economists so that they can 
bring the two camps closer together. 
As Krugman argues, during the period 1980 – 2007 the clash between 
the New Keynesians and New Classical economists was mainly on the basis of 
theory and not action, because in the U.S. there was not much need to implement 
expansionary policies, since recessions were relatively mild over that period. New 
Keynesians thought that monetary policy was sufficient in managing the business 
cycle. In contrast, New Classical economists thought that both expansionary fiscal 
and monetary policy are ineffective, but did not mind the use of monetary policy.
A case in point of why disagreements in the economics profession matter 
for policy is the recent global financial crisis. Farell (2011) argues that there were 
noticeable shifts in the policy debate and implementation in the U.S. starting in 
early 2010 that are attributable to the sovereign debt crises of Iceland and the 
Baltic states. In particular, these crises provided conservative policy makers the 
rhetorical fodder in the debate for more stringent fiscal policy. The intellectual 
support those policy makers needed was, in turn, sought from economists; and the 
disunited profession had what to offer. At the time various prominent economists 
put forward arguments against further extending the stimulus. Examples of such 
arguments are the work of Alesina and Ardagna (2010) supporting expansionary 
austerity and the work of Rogoff and Reinhart (2009) on admissible government 
debt thresholds.  
In addition to the theoretical divide responsible for different approaches 
crisis countries have undertaken in the past, there are some attractive beliefs 
among policy makers that make them pursue non-Keynesian policies in the face 
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of financial and economic turmoil. For example, such a belief is the seemingly 
logical argument that problems of excessive debt, too much private borrowing, 
cannot be solved by creating even more of it – government borrowing (Krugman 
and Eggertsson, 2010). During the Asian Financial Crisis the IMF advised some 
of the crisis-stricken countries to pursue contractionary fiscal policies following 
a similar argument. The intention was to “restore confidence” by convincing the 
markets that irresponsible behavior is a thing of the past.  For similar reasons, 
money market rates were increased and unnecessary structural reforms were 
undertaken (Krugman, 2010). Tightened monetary policy was aimed at convincing 
the markets that the pegged exchange system will be preserved. Some of the 
structural reforms had no particular connection to the crisis but they were also 
aimed at calming down the markets. A typical example of IMF-advised policies 
was what Korea did in 1997. Money market rates were raised up to 25.6 percent 
in M1, 1998. Furthermore, there was an initial tightening of fiscal polcy to rebuild 
confidence (for half a year). 
Furthermore, there might be institutional reasons for some countries’ 
inability to pursue Keynesian policies – Kaminsky et al. argue that developing 
countries face credit constraints during bad times that prevent them from borrowing 
(2004). Furthermore, developing countries tend to also follow procyclical policies 
during good times, meaning that they do not have the necessary cushion to fight 
recessions.  
Advanced countries are not immune to institutional problems. Central 
banks in some developed countries have become increasingly conservative 
in the past two decades, focusing too much on inflation, and this might have its 
consequences during severe recessions (Krugman, 2010). A recent IMF study of 25 
severe recessions in advanced economies finds that prolonged periods of economic 
weakness are associated with falling inflation rates (Meier, 2010). However, it also 
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finds that as the inflation rate goes toward zero, it becomes sticky. This means that 
a severely depressed economy can still have a positive inflation rate – most likely 
because of downward nominal rigidities and well-anchored inflation expectations. 
A central bank that is overly focused on inflation might miss the urgency of the 
situation and not act as aggressive as necessary (Krugman, 2010). 
Finally, there is an additional reason why some countries cannot further 
stimulate a depressed economy – the liquidity trap. Such an environment was 
observed in Japan in the 1990s and is currently the reality in U.S. 
IV. Modeling 
The effect of monetary policy during recessions on the ensuing recoveries is 
first analyzed on the background of countries, experiencing “ordinary” recessions. 
This is meant to serve as a benchmark. Then, the effect of monetary policy is 
analyzed in countries undergoing banking crises.  
Monetary Policy in Ordinary Recessions
The goal is to see if recovery growth rates after ordinary recessions 
are significantly affected by monetary policies.  For that purpose a fixed effects 
model is used (IMF, 2009a). The reason for this is to capture the effect of any 
unobservable country-level characteristics that pertain to the recessions and 
recoveries experienced. For example, a country with an export-oriented economy 
might be able to faster drag itself out of a recession. Such an occurrence would 
be captured by the fixed-effects model assuming that throughout the period under 
consideration the export industry has held a similar role. In particular, the model 
estimated is:
RecGrowth
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The dependent variable is the recovery growth rate one year after the 
trough of the recession.  I control for the amplitude and duration of the recession 
– these are characteristics of the business cycle itself that might differ within 
a certain country over time. For example, there is nothing to make us believe 
that external shocks which hit an economy should be of the same size. Milton 
Friedman’s “plucking model”, which has been empirically verified, suggests 
that the coefficient estimate on Amplitude, c
1, 
should be positive – the deeper 
the recession, the stronger the recovery. Furthermore, I expect that prolonged 
recessions have slower recoveries. As a result, the coefficient estimate on 
Duration, c
2, 
is conjectured to be negative. Duration is measured in quarters.
The monetary policy response over the recession period, the variable 
MP, is measured as the sum of the residuals of a monetary policy rule over each 
quarter over the recession period. I expect that countries that increased interest 
rates above what is warranted by a Taylor rule experienced slower recoveries. As 
a results, the coefficient estimate on MP, c
3 
,is conjectured to be negative.
As mentioned, monetary policy shocks are identified from the residuals 
of a monetary policy rule. For that purpose, following the methodology of the 
latest issue of the World Economic Outlook, a Taylor rule of the following form 
was estimated for each country: 
it=b0+b1*dummy_85+ b2*πt+ b3*gapt+ ut,
where i
t
 is the nominal interest rate, dummy_85 is a dummy for periods after 1985 
(to allow for a shift in equilibrium rates), π
t
 is the inflation rate and gap
t
  is a 
measure of the output gap (potential GDP is measured using the Hodrick-Prescott 
filter). Using the real interest rate as the dependent variable does not change the 
results, since inflation is included in the model.
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 The fiscal policy response over the recession period, the variable CAGC, is 
cyclically adjusted government consumption. I expect that an increase in this variable 
will lead to a higher growth rate of the recovery. Therefore, c
4
should be positive. 
Again, the methodology of the World Economic Outlook is used. First, the elasticity 
of government consumption with respect to the business cycle is estimated:
lngc
t
=d
0
+d
1
*gap
t
+ d
2
*trend+ e
t
.
As above, gap
t 
is a measure of the output gap. Trend is a time trend. Second, the 
cyclically adjusted government consumption is computed as:
CAGC
t
=gc
t
(1-d
1
*gap
t
). 
 In addition to the above estimations, a check for the robustness of the results 
is performed. The duration of the recession is used as dependent variables in some of 
the estimations to see if the effects of the monetary and fiscal policies change. 
Monetary Policy in Financial Crises
The effects of monetary and fiscal policies on the duration of the 
recession and the strength of the recovery following financial crises are analyzed. 
In addition, monetary policy is examined in cases of forbearance - banks left to 
function despite being technically insolvent, and prudential regulations (such as 
for loan classification and loan loss provisioning) suspended or not fully applied. 
If forbearance has a negative effect on the effectiveness of monetary policy, then 
insufficient use and diminished effectiveness of an otherwise powerful tool for 
stimulating recoveries might be responsible for the sluggishness of some financial 
crisis episodes. Data for forbearance is available only for about thirty five countries 
(Laeven and Valencia, 2010), while the sample of all financial crises includes 
about eighty countries. Consequently, two different estimations are performed. 
The model that includes forbearance is:
RecGrowth=c
0
+c
1
*Ampl i tude+c
2
*Durat ion+c
3
*MP+c
4
*MPForb+ 
c
5
*Forbearance + c
6
*GDP(-1) + e  (2)
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The variables RecGrowth, Amplitude, and Duration are the self-
explanatory. They are measured as the recovery growth rate one year after the 
trough of the recession, the sum of GDP growth rates during the recession, and 
the duration of the recession in quarters.  
Monetary policy is measured as the change in real money market rates 
over the course of the recession. If money market rates are not available, then their 
closest substitute is used. The reason for the difference from before is the usage 
of yearly data. Estimating residuals from a Taylor rule would be too imprecise 
with yearly data. A decrease in interest rates would mean that there is a negative 
change in real money market rates. Therefore, we are testing if c
3
, the coefficient 
estimate on the monetary policy measure, is negative. Note that the dependent 
variable is the growth rate, or the output gap, in the recovery phase, which is at 
least one year after the implementation of monetary policies; this would eliminate 
any endogeneity problems. 
In addition to the measure for monetary policy, the regression equation 
includes an interaction term between the changes in real interest rates and 
forbearance. Forbearance is a dummy variable that indicates whether or not there 
is regulatory forbearance during the years [t, t+3], where t denotes the starting 
year of the crisis. This variable is based on a qualitative assessment of information 
contained in IMF Staff Reports (Laeen and Valencia). As part of this assessment, 
information is collected on whether or not banks were permitted to continue 
functioning despite being technically insolvent, and whether or not prudential 
regulations (such as for loan classification and loan loss provisioning) were 
suspended or not fully applied during the first three years of the crisis. 
The interaction term is supposed to estimate whether in cases of 
forbearance the effect of monetary policy is reduced. Previous experience has 
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suggested that this might be the case. For example, many observers consider the 
policies undertaken by Sweden in the early 1990s to have been highly effective 
in restoring the health of the financial system and paving the way for a strong 
recovery through extensive use of expansionary policies (IMF, 2009). In contrast, 
in Japan, slow recognition of the bad-loan problem contributed to a sluggish 
recovery from the financial crisis, even though interest rates were at the zero 
bound. The effectiveness of monetary policy might be disrupted if the interest 
rate and credit channels of the monetary policy transmission mechanism are not 
properly working during a banking crisis.
In other words, the coefficient estimate on MPForb is expected to be 
positive. The marginal impact of MP is given by c
3
+c
4
*Forb. We expect that c
3 
would be negative. Therefore, if forbearance diminishes the effect of monetary 
policy it should be making the whole term bigger (“less negative”). This would 
mean that we are testing whether the coefficient estimate on MPForb, c
4
, is positive. 
Finally, forbearance is also included in the model. We would expect that if 
the authorities do not address and act on failing banking institutions, then this would 
have a direct negative effect on the economy. However, it is not particularly clear 
how long lasting this deleterious impact might be. Generally, we would expect that 
recovery growth rates might be negatively affected by forbearance.  Therefore, we 
are testing to see if the coefficient estimate of Forbearance, c
5
, is negative. 
The estimated model without forbearance would look like:
RecGrowth=c
0
+c
1
*Amplitude+c
2
*Duration+c
3
*MP+c
4
*GC+c
5
*GDP(-1)+e  (3)
The definition of the variables is the same as above. The only difference 
is that the government consumption variable is added. In particular, fiscal policy 
is proxied by the percentage change in government consumption. This measure 
is used instead of the fiscal balance, because the last would cause endogeneity. A 
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change in output affects the fiscal balance (it is a fraction of output) and a change 
in the fiscal balance affects output.  An increase in government consumption 
during the recession phase is expected to positively affect recovery growth 
rates. Therefore, we are testing if c
4
, the coefficient estimate on the change in 
government consumption, is positive. 
In addition to the above estimations, a couple of robustness checks are 
performed. The duration of the recession and the output gap one year after the end 
of the recession are used as dependent variables. 
Data
In getting a better understanding of the recovery that will follow the 2008-09 
recession through the lenses of historical experience we have two choices. We can 
either draw conclusions from the financial crises that occurred during the 1930s, 
or look at the ones that have plagued the world in the past forty years. The reason 
for this is the striking pattern of occurrence of financial crises worldwide. From 
the 1940s up to the early 1970s, there were almost no banking crises in the world.1 
However, with the financial and international capital account liberalization of the 
1970s, banking crises have re-emerged (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009a).
This paper focuses on the period 1970-2005 and it uses two distinct data sets. 
The first one consists of data on recessions and recoveries in a set of advanced 
countries. The countries are those identified in the Statistical Appendix of the 
2010 issue of the World Economic Outlook as advanced. Then, subject to data 
availability the monetary and fiscal policy responses during all of the recessions 
since 1970 in the selected countries are analyzed.  Quarterly data is used. To 
1 Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) argue that this calm might be partly explained by booming world 
growth, but perhaps more so by the repression of the domestic financial markets (in varying de-
grees) and the heavy-handed use of capital controls followed for many years after WWII. 
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measure the stance of monetary and fiscal policies money market rates and 
government consumption are employed. The main source of the data is the 
International Financial Statistics database of the IMF. Given that only a few of the 
countries have data going back before 1977 this limits the sample. 
The procedure for identifying business cycles is an algorithm called BBQ 
(Bry and Boschan procedure for quarterly data; see Harding and Pagan, 2002). 
A MATLAB version of a program that imitates the algorithm can be found at 
www.ncer.edu.au. It uses quarterly output data to identify peaks and troughs. 
A complete cycle goes from one peak to the next peak with its two phases the 
contraction phase (from peak to trough) and the expansion phase (from trough to 
peak). The algorithm requires that the minimum duration of the complete cycle 
and each phase must be at least five and two quarters, respectively. Table1 in the 
appendix shows the recessions (peak-to-trough) identified by this algorithm.
 The second dataset consists of eighty financial crisis episodes in both 
developed and developing countries. Laeven and Valencia identify 124 systemic 
banking crises between 1970 and 2007 (2008). Data on real GDP, inflation, 
government consumption and interest rates is collected from the International 
Financial Statistics database of the IMF. Eighty of the 124 crisis episodes had 
output data available. Furthermore, of those eighty countries not all have both 
government consumption and interest rates data available. As a result, the sample 
is limited to less than eighty countries in the various regressions below. To measure 
the stance of monetary and fiscal policy money market rates and government 
consumption are used. Wherever money market rates are unavailable, their closest 
substitute is used. Data on forbearance is taken from Laeven and Valencia (2010) 
and it is limited to about 35 countries for which the authors provide information 
on various financial policies undertaken. All data is yearly.
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 Figures 1 and 2, in the appendix, describe the output dynamics and duration 
of recessions associated with financial crises. Those recessions are particularly 
severe – the amplitude of the recession is on average about four percent of real 
GDP and the mean duration is about five quarters. In addition, seventy percent 
of the crisis periods considered have a duration of one year or more. The policy 
response in those crises is illustrated in Figures 3 and 4. Monetary policy, proxied 
by the change in money market rates, seems to be expansionary – real interest 
rates have declined during both the first year and the whole duration of the crisis. 
However, these declines can be mainly explained by the inflationary dynamics in 
the countries and not by the explicit behavior of policy makers. Figure 3 shows 
that nominal interest rates have actually increased slightly. On the contrary, fiscal 
policy, proxied by the change in government consumption, seems to be markedly 
procyclical. Approximately one half of the crisis episodes were characterized by a 
negative change in government consumption during the duration of the recession. 
Note that government consumption data is available for 78 out of the 80 countries 
under consideration. That number for interest rates is 70.
 The start of the financial crises themselves is taken from Laeven and 
Valencia (2008). The peaks of the recessions are identified using a one-year 
window around the start of the financial crisis. In this way, it is ensured that the 
recessions under consideration are, in fact, associated with the financial crises. 
Note, however, that in some of the crisis periods there was no output loss – in 
those cases, following Cecchetti et al. (2010) the duration and the amplitude of the 
recession are set equal to zero. Table 2, in the appendix, shows the start of each of 
the banking crises under consideration (Laeven and Valencia, 2008). 
V. Empirical Evidence
The effects of monetary and fiscal policies during recessions on the ensuing 
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recoveries are first analyzed in the sample of advanced countries, experiencing 
“ordinary” recessions. Then, the effects of monetary and fiscal policies are 
analyzed in the sample of countries undergoing banking crises. 
Monetary and Fiscal Policies in Ordinary Recessions 
The table below shows the regression results from estimating the 
fixed effects model specified above – regressions (3) and (4). In addition to this 
model, one is estimated with a dependant variable the duration of the recession – 
regressions (1) and (2). The results of the two sets of models are largely consistent. 
The same set of variables is statistically significant in both of them. Also, the 
estimations without fixed effects in both cases have a much smaller explanatory 
power than the ones with fixed effects. 
Table 3 – Results for the severity and sluggishness of ordinary recessions.
 (1) (2) (3) (4)
Duration   -.024 -.077
   (-.13) (-0.46)
Amplitude -.109 -.133 -.488*** -.130
 (-0.91) (-3.00)*** (-3.19) (-1.47)
RealRate 5.39 4.93 -4.207 -1.005
 (2.60)** (2.72)*** (-2.43)*** (-.62)
GC .134 .006 .120 .008
 (1.50) (0.22) (.373) (.18)
Fixed Effects Yes No Yes No
Observations 66 66 74 66
R-squared 0.41 0.30 0.40 0.04
Notes: unbalanced panel with country fixed effects. t-statistics are in brackets. *, **, *** 
denote level of significance indicating 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Robust standard errors 
used. The dependent variable in (1) and (2) is the duration of the recession. The dependent 
variable in (3) and (4) is the recovery growth rate one year after the trough of the recession.
Looking at regression numbered (3) we see that the recession amplitude 
has a statistically significant effect on the growth rate in the recovery phase. The 
coefficient estimate is statistically significant in difference from zero at the 1 
percent level of significance. Note that amplitude measures the percentage decline 
in GDP during the recession phase – peak to trough. This result suggests that 
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the steeper the recession, the faster the recovery. Furthermore, as expected the 
coefficient estimate on the RealRate is also statistically significant in difference 
from zero – at the five percent level of significance. As previously noted the 
RealRate is the sum of the impulses relative to the policy rule for each quarter over 
the recession period. In other words, RealRate represents the sum of the residuals 
from an estimated monetary policy rule. This would mean that an increase in the 
RealRate corresponds to an increase in money market rates above what a policy 
rule warrants. Therefore, as expected the coefficient estimate is negative. However, 
government consumption does not significantly affect recovery growth rates. One 
reason for this occurrence might be that the estimation does not account for the 
level of government debt, something found to be important for the effectiveness 
of fiscal policy (IMF, 2009). Furthermore, as Krugman and Eggertsson (2010) 
argue, the effect of fiscal policy is the biggest when there are credit constrained 
agents in the economy – as during a financial crisis. 
The coefficient estimates agree in magnitude with those estimates in 
previous studies (IMF, 2009). In addition, the R-squared of the fixed effects 
model is pretty high, 40 percent, given that the dependent variable is growth rates 
one year after the recession has occurred. However, the R-squared of the model 
without the fixed effects is rather low – less than 4 percent of the variation of the 
dependent variable is explained by the independent variables included. 
The estimation that has the duration of the recession as the dependent 
variable (regression equation (1) also suggests that monetary policy significantly 
affects the length of the recession. 
Monetary Policy in Financial Crises 
 The table below shows the regression results from estimating the model 
for financial crises. The dependent variables in (1), (2) and (3) are the duration of 
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the recession, the recovery growth rate and the output gap one year after the trough 
of the recession. The results of these three models are consistent with each other. 
In models (1), (2) and (3) increases in government consumption have a significant 
negative effect on the duration of the recession and a significant positive effect on 
recovery growth rates. The growth rate of GDP prior to the recession also seems 
to matter (regression equations (1) and (2)). Countries with higher prior growth 
rates tend to have stronger recoveries and shorter recessions. 
Table 2 – Results for severity and sluggishness of banking crises.
 (1) (2) (3)                           
Duration  -.058 -.003
  (-.62) (-4.82)***
Amplitude  -.066                                
  (0.33)                                
Real GDP (-1) -.428 .232 -.0003    
 (-1.77)* (1.86)* (0.86)    
RealRate 0.011 .011 -.0003                           
 (0.32) (0.50) (-.79)                      
Cum.Gov.Con. -.125 .066 .001                                                  
 (-3.74)*** (2.06)** (3.23)***                                                        
Observations 66 65 66                                 
R-squared 0.17 0.14 0.40        
                      
Notes: unbalanced panel with country fixed effects. t-statistics are in brackets. *, **, *** 
denote level of significance indicating 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Robust standard 
errors used. The dependent variables in (1), (2) and (3) are the duration of the recession, the 
recovery growth rate and the output gap one year after the trough of the recession. 
However, monetary policy does not significantly affect recovery growth 
rates, output gaps and duration of the recession. This might be due to the reduced 
effectiveness of monetary policy transmission mechanism during times of 
financial distress (IMF, 2009). The same results hold whether real or nominal 
rates are used. Furthermore, it does not make a differenceifthe cumulative change 
in interest rates over the whole duration of the recession is used or the change in 
the first year of the crisis. There have been reversals of policy, especially in the 
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crises that involve currency upheavals like the ones in the Asian Financial crisis 
so such a check makes sense. 
 As explained before, the effectiveness of monetary policy might be 
affected by the extent to which financial reforms were implemented in the affected 
countries. To formally test this hypothesis, a smaller sample of countries is used, for 
which data on forbearance is available. Forbearance is the qualitative assessment 
of whether banks were permitted to continue functioning despite being technically 
insolvent. The regressions below try to assess the impact of forbearance. Again, 
three dependent variables are used – the duration of the recession, the recovery 
growth rate and the output gap one year after the trough of the recession. 
Table 3 – Results for the effect of monetary policy in the case of forbearance during 
banking crises.
 (1) (2) (3)
Duration  -.052  -.004 
  (-0.40) (-2.98)***           
Amplitude  -.018                                             
   (-0.18)                                          
Real GDP (-1) -.060 .006   -.0008
 (-0.27)    (0.964)        (-0.37) 
RealRate -.034 .004         -.0026***
 (0.59)  (0.92)         (-4.34) 
RealRate*Forb. .06                   .092   .020 
 (0.92) (1.30) (2.70)** 
Forb.                        -1.35 2.42 -.020   
                               (2.07)** (-1.16) (-0.55)                                 
Observations       30           30           30                
R-squared            .03             0.27       0.47        
Notes: t-statistics are in brackets. *, **, *** denote level of significance indicating 10%, 
5% and 1% respectively. The dependent variables in (1), (2) and (3) are the duration of 
the recession, the recovery growth rate and the output gap one year after the trough of the 
recession. Robust standard errors used.
The coefficient estimates in the model that has recovery growth rates as a 
dependent variable are statistically insignificant in difference from zero. However, 
in the estimation using the output gap as the dependent variable, the change in 
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money market rates is statistically significant. An increase in money market rates 
leads to a decrease in the output gap. Furthermore, forbearance dampens the 
effect of monetary policy as indicated by the negative coefficient estimate on 
RealRate*Forb. Also, this diminishing effect seems to be quite significant as it 
is bigger in magnitude than the positive effect of monetary policy on recovery 
growth rates. The lack of explanatory power of the independent variables in the 
model with recovery growth rates as the regressand agrees with previous studies 
which find that recovery growth rates are harder to predict than output gaps (IMF, 
2009). Furthermore, we can see that the estimation with duration as the dependent 
variable also lacks statistical significance. This might be explained with the 
fact that forbearance is defined over the three years following the beginning of 
the recession. As a result, its effect might not be felt during the duration of the 
recession.  
In summary, the empirical results suggest differences between the effects of 
monetary and fiscal policies on the duration of recessions and the strength of 
recoveries in ordinary recessions and in systemic financial crises. During ordinary 
recessions expansionary monetary policy seems to be a powerful tool, generating 
significant increases in recovery growth rates. During recessions associated with 
financial crises, expansionary monetary policy still has a significant effect on the 
strength of the recovery. However, this effect is dependent on the implementation 
of prompt financial policies, and in particular, on intervention with insolvent 
financial institutions. The effectiveness of fiscal policy is reversed – it is a 
powerful tool during banking crises, but it does not seem to significantly affect 
recovery growth rates during ordinary recessions. 
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VI. Conclusions
Non-Keynesian policies in the face of a financial crisis are not a thing of 
the past. A number of advanced economies have pursued contractionary policies 
in the most recent financial crisis. This has certainly been the case in Europe. 
Many countries there embraced austerity in the face of a slumping economy – 
France, Britain and Ireland, for example. In addition, some EU members had to 
settle with insufficiently expansionary monetary policies, because of the outsized 
influence of Germany over the European Central bank and the better performance 
of the German economy. While policies in the U.S. have been more favorable 
towards sustaining a recovery, this has not come without much debate. Ideas and 
arguments supporting fiscal retrenchment have abounded. This is exemplified in 
the work of some prominent economists like that of Alesina and Ardagna (2009). 
The political climate has also been antagonistic towards some of the actions 
policy makers have tried to undertake. For example, there was a huge backlash 
against the quantitative easing program the Fed started to implement in late 2010 
– something that can have a particularly deleterious effect when the economy is 
in the midst of a liquidity trap and when the Fed’s credibility in influencing the 
public’s expectations is the main tool out (Mankiw and Weinzierl, 2011). 
In this paper, I use two different samples with data from 1970 to 2005 to 
study the effects of monetary and fiscal policies on the profiles of recessions and 
recoveries. In other words, I ask whether pursuing non-Keynesian policies has 
mattered during past financial crises. Several results emerged from the econometric 
analysis. First, monetary policy during ordinary recessions and banking crises is a 
powerful tool with lasting effects that extend to recovery growth rates. However, 
the effect of monetary policy during financial crises is strongly diminished in the 
case of forbearance – banks left to function despite being technically insolvent. 
Second, the effectiveness of fiscal policy is reversed – it is a powerful tool during 
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banking crises, but it does not seem to significantly affect recovery growth rates 
during ordinary recessions. Finally, the policy response during past financial crisis 
does not seem to be particularly expansionary – on the contrary, fiscal policy is 
markedly procyclical, while monetary policy is neutral. In summary, the results 
suggest it is possible that inappropriate fiscal and monetary policies and the lack 
of financial reforms could be one reason why recoveries associated with financial 
crises turn out to be particularly protracted.
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009b) argue that both advanced and developing 
countries suffer from the “this time is different” syndrome when it comes to 
financial crises, because policy makers and the public tend to believe that they 
are immune from a crisis due to some circumstances that make them special. 2 
This paper suggests that this syndrome should be avoided when it comes to policy 
as well. This time is not different and expansionary policies should be pursued. 
Past financial crises have been so protracted in part because of the embracement 
of austerity and in part because of the lack of realization that financial crises are 
inherently more severe. 
2 An example of that line of thinking involves the securitization process of mortgage backed securi-
ties in the U.S. prior to the most recent recession. People thought that these new “synthetic” prod-
ucts have managed to practically eliminate all risk from the economy. With the benefit of hindsight, 
we know that this was not the case. 
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Figure 1: Output Dynamics in Banking Crises (growth rates) 
 
 
Figure 2: Duration of Banking Crises (in years) 
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Figure 3: Change in Interest Rates (first year of crisis and peak-to-trough) 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Change in Government Consumption (first year of crisis and peak-to-trough) 
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Table 1: Recessions in Advanced Countries (peaks and troughs)
Country Peak Trough
Australia 1960 Q3 1961 Q3
Australia 1965 Q2 1966 Q1
Australia 1971 Q3 1972 Q1
Australia 1975 Q2 1976
Australia 1977 Q2 1978
Australia 1981 Q3 1983 Q2
Australia 1990 Q2 1991 Q2
Austria 1978 1979 Q1
Austria 1981 1982 Q1
Austria 1984 1985 Q1
Austria 2001 2002 Q1
Belgium 1982 1983 Q1
Belgium 1992 1993 Q1
Belgium 1998 1998 Q3
Canada 1980 Q1 1980 Q3
Canada 1981 Q2 1983
Canada 1990 Q1 1991 Q1
Denmark 1977 Q3 1978 Q1
Denmark 1980 1981 Q1
Denmark 1988 1988 Q3
Denmark 1993 1993 Q3
Denmark 1995 1995 Q3
Denmark 2002 2003 Q1
Denmark 2005 2006 Q1
France 1974 Q3 1975 Q1
France 1992 Q3 1993 Q2
Germany 1962 Q3 1963 Q1
Germany 1966 Q3 1967 Q2
Germany 1974 Q1 1975 Q2
Germany 1978 1978 Q2
Germany 1980 Q1 1982 Q3
Germany 1992 Q1 1993 Q1
Germany 1995 Q3 1996 Q1
Germany 2002 Q3 2003 Q2
Italy 1981 1981 Q3
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Italy 1982 Q1 1983
Italy 1992 Q1 1993 Q3
Italy 1996 Q1 1997
Italy 2001 Q1 2002
Italy 2003 2003 Q2
Italy 2004 Q3 2005 Q1
Japan 1974 1975 Q1
Japan 1993 Q1 1993 Q3
Japan (financial crisis) 1997 Q1 1999 Q1
Japan 2001 Q1 2002
Netherlands 1980 Q1 1981 Q3
Netherlands 1982 Q1 1983 Q1
Netherlands 2001 Q2 2002 Q1
Portugal 1978 1978 Q2
Portugal 1981 Q2 1982 Q1
Portugal 1983 1984 Q1
Portugal 1992 Q1 1993 Q1
Portugal 2002 2003 Q1
Portugal 2005 Q2 2007 Q1
Spain 1975 1975 Q2
Spain (financial crisis) 1978 Q3 1979 Q1
Spain 1981 1981 Q2
Spain 1992 Q1 1993 Q2
Switzerland 1981 Q2 1983
Switzerland 1986 Q2 1987
Switzerland 1990 Q3 1991 Q2
Switzerland 1992 Q1 1993 Q1
Switzerland 1996 Q1 1996 Q3
Switzerland 2002 Q2 2003 Q2
United Kingdom 1961 Q2 1962
United Kingdom 1973 Q2 1974 Q1
United Kingdom 1974 Q3 1975 Q3
United Kingdom 1979 Q2 1981 Q1
United Kingdom 1990 Q2 1991 Q3
USA 1969 Q3 1971
USA 1974 1975 Q1
USA 1980 Q1 1980 Q3
USA 1981 Q3 1982 Q1
USA 1990 Q2 1991 Q1
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Table 2: Financial Crises included in the sample (Laeven and Valencia, 2008) 
 
Country 
Start of 
Financial 
Crisis 
Argentina 2001 
Argentina 1995 
Bangladesh  1987 
Benin  1988 
Bolivia 1986 
Bolivia 1994 
Brazil  1990 
Brazi 1994 
Bulgaria 1996 
Burkina Faso 1990 
Burundi  1994 
Cameroon  1987 
Cameroon  1995 
Cape Verde   1993 
Central African Rep.  1995 
Chad  1992 
Chile 1981 
Chile  1976 
China, P.R.  1998 
Colombia 1998 
Colombia  1982 
Congo, Republic of  1992 
Costa Rica  1987 
Costa Rica  1994 
Croatia 1998 
Czech Republic 1996 
Dominican Republic 2003 
Ecuador 1998 
Ecuador  1982 
Finland 1991 
Ghana  1982 
Guinea-Bissau  1995 
Guyana  1993 
Hungary 1991 
India  1993 
Indonesia 1997 
Jamaica 1996 
Japan 1997 
Jordan  1989 
Kenya  1985 
Kenya  1992 
Korea 1997 
Kuwait  1982 
Latvia 1995 
Lithuania 1995 
Madagascar  1988 
Malaysia 1997 
Mali  1987 
Mexico 1994 
Mexico  1981 
Morocco  1980 
Mozambique  1987 
Nepal  1988 
Nicaragua 2000 
Nigeria  1991 
Norway 1991 
Panama 1988 
Paraguay 1995 
Peru  1983 
Philippines  1983 
Philippines 1997 
Poland  1992 
Russia 1998 
Senegal  1988 
Slovak Republic  1998 
Spain  1977 
Sri Lanka 1989 
Swaziland  1995 
Sweden 1991 
Thailand 1997 
Thailand  1983 
Togo  1993 
Tunisia  1991 
Turkey 2000 
Uganda  1994 
United States  1988 
Uruguay  1981 
Uruguay  2002 
Venezuela 1994 
Vietnam 1997 
Yemen 1996 
Zambia 1995 
Zimbabwe  1995 
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